QUICKEN? NOT SO FAST

By Rav Shmuel Honigwachs, Shabbos, Kashrus, and Ribbis Divisions,

Bais HaVaad Halacha Center

Volume 5778 • Issue 1 • Parshas Behalosecha • A Publication of the Bais HaVaad Halacha center

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Quicken Loans recently surpassed Wells Fargo to become America’s largest home mortgage lender. That’s good news for Quicken Loans. But it brings cause for concern. Not only for Wells Fargo, but for the thousands of Jews whose homes are mortgaged to the Quicken lending behemoth.

A recent notice from the Agudah’s Conference of Synagogue Rabbonim (inset) publicized the p’sak of Gedolei Yisroel that the company is Halachically deemed to be under Jewish ownership. Consequently, to borrow with interest from Quicken is to violate the issur of ribbis, and that loan would be prohibited without a heter iska, notwithstanding the company’s reported assurances to clients that a heter iska isn’t necessary.

But if you’re among the millions who already have a Quicken loan, what to do? Must you refrain from making interest payments and cede your home to foreclosure?

There’s good news for you, too. What follows is a survey of the issues.

I.O. WHO?

There is an active secondary market for home loans, so the company that lent you the money may no longer be your creditor. Frequently, loans are sold very soon after they are originated.

This cuts both ways: Even if you borrowed from a Jewish company, you may now owe the money to non-Jews who bought the debt. And even if you borrowed from non-Jews, you may now be indebted to Jews and require a heter iska. Make a phone call and find out.

Note that the loan servicer, the company that communicates with you regarding the loan and to which you send your payments, may not be your creditor. Quicken, for example, services many loans it doesn’t own, on behalf of other creditors.

CONTROLLING INTEREST

If what emerges from your inquiries is that you do indeed have a Jewish creditor, you must refinance the loan as soon as possible. But to avert foreclosure until the refinance goes through, by what means may payments be made that does not entail a violation of ribbis?

LIFE INTEREST

R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l and R’ Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l were reportedly asked whether a customer of Israel Electric who fell behind in his bill payments may pay the interest he is charged. As cited by the Nesivos Shalom on Hilchos Ribbis, they permitted this, reasoning that the customer’s intention isn’t to pay ribbis but simply to keep his electricity on. (The Nesivos Shalom observes that the Sha’ar Deia seems to dispute this view.)

The case at hand would appear comparable. Thus according to this p’sak, one who learns that his mortgagee is Jewish may continue to make the payments to stave off foreclosure. However, the ruling was not recorded in writing, so I cannot recommend that one rely upon the account of its issuance.

CORPORATE INTERESTS

According to some Acharonim, there is no issur of ribbis where the lender is a corporation—which Quicken Loans Inc. is—rendering the entire issue moot. Many authorities, however, disagree, and the Halacha does not follow the permissive view.

DISINTERESTED

There is a minority opinion that one may, l’chatchila, borrow at interest from a nonobservant Jew. This opinion may not be relied upon on its own, but it may possibly be combined with some of the other factors listed here.

INTEREST GROUP

If the borrower is a corporation, the shareholders who discover post facto that their creditor is Jewish may rely on the view of the Igros Moshe that ribbis doesn’t apply to corporate borrowers.

MAJORITY INTEREST

If one is unsure whether his American lender is Jewish, he may rely, according to many poskim, on the precept of rov to assume that it is not.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

R’ Shlomo Miller shlit”a proposes a novel way that payments may be made until a refinancing is concluded.

The Gemara in Bava Metzia 69b says that it is permitted for a Jew to pay someone to lend money to someone else. Because the lender receives money not from the borrower but from a third party, it is not ribbis. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 160:13) codifies this statement with qualifications, including: a) The borrower may not reimburse the third party. b) The third party must offer the lender the money of his own volition, not at the behest of the borrower.

This second qualification is disputed by the Shach (ibid. §18), who maintains that a prospective borrower may ask a third party to offer money to incentivize a lender. The Shach further asserts that even the Shulchan Aruch agrees that the practice is Biblically permitted, and the prohibition he identifies is Rabbinic.

Based on this sugya, Rav Miller offers a remedy for our Quicken quandary. Rather than make the mortgage payments, ask a friend to make them on your behalf, without giving him a Halachically-binding guarantee of reimbursement. You may then reimburse him each month for the payment he made. This would be permitted so long as the friend doesn’t view his payment to Quicken Loans as coming from you. Rather, his intent should be that he himself is making the payment in satisfaction of your debt. (See footnote for elaboration.)

Although the aforecited Shulchan Aruch precludes a borrower from reimbursing a third party for his payment to a lender, that is a Rabbinic ban. Wherever the Torah prohibition of ribbis applies, all parties to the loan—lender, borrower, even witnesses—are in violation. However, the Rama (Y.D. 160:1) writes that in a case where the ribbis is Rabbinic, only lending is forbidden, not even borrowing, so no prohibition would obtain here.

Some question Rav Miller’s approach based on the concept of eved k’na’ani, and suggest that once a borrower has obligated himself to pay interest, making a payment on his behalf is forbidden.

This argument is easier to sustain in the case where a Jewish creditor made a loan to a Jewish borrower. However, where a Jew borrowed from a non-Jew, and the non-Jew then sold the loan to a Jew, it is possible that, Halachically, there is now no interest obligation at all. Although the Jewish borrower undertook to pay interest to the original non-Jewish creditor, now that a Jew—who is forbidden to charge a fellow Jew interest—has bought the debt, the interest obligation may not transfer with the sale.

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To be clear: This article concerns a person who has, unknowingly, already borrowed from a Jewish lender. It must not be construed to permit borrowing, l’chatchila, from a Jewish lender, even on a short-term basis while pursuing replacement financing.

If you have any questions about implementing Rav Miller’s prescription, please contact me at the Bais HaVaad at (732) 276-1344 extension 363.

In the z’chus of scrupulous observance of the issur of ribbis, may we merit bracha b’chol ma’asei yadainu va’asakainu.

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וימצאו איש מקושש עצים ביום השבת וגו'. ויניחו אותו במשמר כי לא פרש מה יעשה לו.

(Bemidbar 15:32, 34)

Adapted from a shiur by Rav Yosef Greenwald

According to Chazal (Sifrei Zuta), the mekoshesh violated Shabbos in front of the entire people to demonstrate that one who desecrates Shabbos would be put to death. The Gemara (Bava Basra 119a) says that Moshe knew the man was chayav misa but didn’t know which misa, and he therefore placed him in jail temporarily.

The Chasam Sofer (Kovetz Teshuvos 85) challenges this from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 17a) that says that a Sanhedrin that witnessed a murder may not execute the murderer. How could Moshe sentence the mekoshesh to death if everyone witnessed his transgression?

The Chasam Sofer answers that the Gemara's principle is based on vehitzilu ha’eida, the Torah's imperative for Bais Din to save the murderer, which they would be unable to do if they witnessed the incident themselves and know he is guilty. But in this case, they were unsure whether one may be put to death without a warning detailing which death he would receive (see Sanhedrin 78b). This sufficed for the purposes of vehitzilu ha'eidah.

However, the reason of the Gemara may actually be that ein eid naaseh dayan, a witness cannot serve as a judge. Because the Sanhedrin witnessed the incident, they cannot serve as dayanim afterward. Some commentaries therefore suggest a different answer to the Chasam Sofer's question: According to the Ramban in Makkos, a Bais Din may execute a murderer without following the standard protocol based on the mitzvah of uviarta hara mikirbecha: If there is no other legal way to sentence him to death, we can still do so based on this principle if it is certain he is guilty. On this basis, Moshe may have been permitted to kill the mekoshesh despite the fact that everyone witnessed his actions.

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1 סי’ ק”ס סוף סעיף י”ג

2 עיי”ש בשער דעה דמיירי בגוונא שהמלוה הוא ישראל כשר ולקח משכון של ישראל מגוי ואינו מחוייב להאמינו להלוה שבאמת הוא משכונו של ישראל ולכן אינו מחוייב להחזירו ללוה אא”כ ישלם לו הריבית. ועפ”ז לכאו’ יש לחלק בין דברי השער דעה לדברי הגרשז”א והגריש”א זצ”ל שהם מיירי באופן שהמלוה יודע שהלוה הוא ישראל ומצד המלוה אסור לגבות וא”כ במה שמנתק את העלעקטריק הוא גזל בעלמא והלוה בא להציל את עצמו שלא יגזול ממנו לא מיקרי תשלומי ריבית משא”כ בגוונא דהשער דעה דהמלוה אינו מחוייב להאמין שהוא של ישראל ומותר לו לעכב המשכון א”כ אין כאן גזל וצ”ע אם יש בזה כדי לחלק כי באמת לא הבנתי את עצם סברתם של הגרשז”א והגריש”א זצ”ל וגם העירו לי שי”ל שלא שייך סברת הגרשז”א והגריש”א זצ”ל כ”א בחברת החשמל מטעמים שונים.

3 עי’ בשו”ת שו”מ מהד”ק ח”ג ל”א ובמהר”ם שיק יו”ד קנ”ח דרכ”ת ק”ס ט”ו מהרש”ג ח”א ג’ ומהרי”א הלוי ח”ב נ”ד.

4 עי’ רע”א ריש סי’ קנ”ט שכ’ דיש שני טעמים למ”ד שמותר להלוות למומר א’ משום שאינו בכלל אחיך וב’ דאין אתה מצווה להחיותו ולטעם הראשון היה מותר גם ללוות ממומר ואינו עובר אלא משום לפני עוור ולדבריו בגוונא שיש מתירים כמו בלווה מבנק י”ל שאין בו איסור לפנ”ע וצ”ע בזה ובמומרים דידן אם יש להם דין מומרים או תנוקות שנשבו עיי”ש בפ”ת ס”ק ז’ בשם הרדב”ז שכ’ שיש ספק בזה.

5 דהלא הגריש”א זצ”ל הביא דברי האג”מ בתשובותיו הגם דהמנח”י בח”ג סי’ א’ חלק בתוקף מ”מ בניד”ד בשעת הדחק יש להקל. (דבאמת יש ליישב קושיותיו של המנח”י דלא שייכי דברי האג”מ בזמן חז”ל דאמרינן מנה אין כאן משכון אין כאן ולא שייך שיעבוד נכסים בלי שיעבוד הגוף. והתירו של האג”מ לא שייך אלא בזמנינו שע”פ דינא דמלכותא יש מושג של שיעבוד נכסים בלי שיעבוד הגוף וצ”ע בזה)

6 כך שמעתי ממו”ר הגרש”א מילר שליט”א דהוי ספק קבוע ושיש להקל.

7 ובפתחי תשובה ס”ק ט’ הביא דעה דאסור מה”ת.

8 עי’ כעין דברי הגרש”א מילר שליט”א בחוו”ד סי’ ק”ס ס”ק